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The Impacts of Health Care Reforms on the Efficiency of 
The Turkish Public Hospitals: Provincial Markets1 
Assist. Prof. Seher Nur Sulku2 
Abstract: Turkey has implemented major health care reforms to improve the 
efficiency of the health care system since 2003. The objective of this study is to investigate 
the impact of these reforms, especially the performance-based payment system (P4P), on the 
efficiency of public hospitals. We employ the Data Envelopment Approach and the 
Malmquist index to comparatively examine before and after the reform years, 2001 and 2006 
respectively. Our analyses compare the performances of public hospitals served in provincial 
markets. Inputs of number of beds, number of primary care physician, and number of 
specialists, and how they are used to produce outputs of inpatient discharges, outpatient visits, 
surgical operations are investigated. Indeed, as the quality indicators dead rate, hospital bed 
occupation rate and average length of stay are considered.  
 
We found that the P4P was successful in boosting productivity due to advancements in 
technology and technical efficiency. It is seen that the average technical efficiency gains took 
place because of the significantly improved scale efficiencies, but the average pure technical 
efficiency did not improve. The lower pure technical efficiencies compared to scale 
efficiencies affirms the lack adaptation of the hospital management to the renewed system. 
Additionally, our analysis indicates that in the socio-economically disadvantaged provinces 
productivity gains have not been achieved. Lastly, it is seen that the hospital quality indicators 
have not improved in the short run. 
 
In the international literature, P4P has been examined extensively for the developed 
countries. However there are a limited number of studies on developing countries. As it has 
been noted in the OECD health system review of Turkey: “Turkey is closing the performance 
gap with other OECD countries and, on a number of measures including overall costs, 
performs well relative to other comparable upper middle-income countries. Indeed, there may 
be much that other countries can learn from the recent health reforms in Turkey, especially in 
the use of performance-related pay to raise staff productivity”. Thus, our study would 
contribute to the existing literature with a comprehensive analysis of the health system 
efficiency in Turkey.  
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Introduction 
 
In order to align its health care system with the health regulations of the European 
Union and OECD countries, Turkey initiated the “Health Transformation Programme” (HTP) 
in 2003. The health system prior to HTP reforms was fragmented in terms of provision and 
financing. Health insurance was provided by five separate public schemes, each with its own 
provider network and varying benefit packages. Turkey’s health care delivery system was 
composed of public and private providers. Within the hospital sector, there were three main 
public providers: the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Social Insurance Organization (SSK) and 
universities (there were 751 hospitals operated by the MoH, 118 SSK hospitals, 43 university 
hospitals, and 267 private hospitals in 2001 [20]). 
   Since 2003, Turkey has implemented major health care reforms in order to improve 
the efficiency of its health care system. As part of the major structural changes in the health 
care system, which includes the integration of security schemes under the Social Security 
Institution (SSI) and the implementation of Universal Health Insurance, the MoH has 
implemented important reforms in the financing of the hospital sector. The SSK health 
facilities have been transferred to the MoH, thereby separating the purchaser and the provider 
of health services. A performance-based supplementary payment system (P4P) has been 
initiated in the MoH health facilities. The health information systems have been upgraded. 
Moreover, health personnel in the MoH hospitals had access to improved medical technology 
and diagnostics through both increased government investments and out sourcing these 
services to the private sector. [22, 23, 26] 
 The objective of our study is to investigate the impact of the HTP reforms, especially 
the performance-based payment system, on the efficiency and productivity of public hospitals 
in Turkey. During the reform period, the dynamic of the hospital sector has been changing 
due to a rapid increase in the number of private hospitals. Between the 2001 and 2006 the 
number of private hospitals increased 24.3%, rising from 267 to 332 [20,21]. SSI has been 
contracting with private facilities for the delivery of outpatient and inpatient health services. 
But still, the public hospitals have the greatest share of the hospital sector in Turkey; there 
were 769 hospitals operated by the MoH and 56 university hospitals in 2006 [21]. Thus, 
measuring the impact of the reforms on hospital efficiency is crucial for policymakers to 
evaluate the health care reforms.  
This study employs Data Envelopment Analysis and the Malmquist index on the 
multiple inputs and outputs of the public hospitals in 81 provincial markets in years 2001 and 
2006 (pre and post reform years, respectively). In the DEA, the numbers of beds, primary care 
physicians and specialists are considered as input variables and the numbers of inpatient 
discharges, outpatient visits and surgical operations are taken as output variables. Indeed, as 
the quality indicators dead rate, hospital bed occupation rate and average length of stay are 
considered. We employ Data Envelopment Analysis (Computer) Program (DEAP) version 2.1 
to conduct the DEA and the Malmquist index analysis [7].  
In the 2009-2013 Strategic Plan, the MoH states that the establishment of public 
hospital unions will be completed until 2013 [1] and, according to the Public Hospital Unions 
Law, all MoH hospitals in the same province will be united under one union and jointly carry 
out the program, planning, budgeting, and implementation. Therefore, to provide the 
necessary feedback to the policy-makers, our analyses compare the public hospitals in terms 
of provinces serving as the Decision Making Units.   
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P4P has been examined extensively for the developed countries in the literature but 
there are a limited number of studies on developing countries [18]. Thus, our study would 
contribute to the existing literature with a comprehensive analysis of the system in a 
developing country. Turkey case is especially interesting since it is an upper middle income 
developing country having a long history of European alignment and is presently engaged in 
extensive health reforms. 
 
The Turkish Health Care System and The HTP Reforms  
 
Overview 
 
 Turkey is an upper-middle-income country with a per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) of US$10,436 in 2008, which was a lower-middle-income country with per capita 
GDP of US$3,383 in 2003. Parallel to rapid growth on Turkish economy, health expenditures 
has also increased.  Total health expenditure was US$18.2 billion in 2003 and it has reached 
to US$30.6 billion in 2006 by increasing 68%. During this period, even though there was a 
increase in health expenditures, health expenses ratio to GDP decreased from 6% to 5.7%. 
Public sector expenditures comprised 72.4% of total health expenditures, while the private 
sector comprised the remaining 27.5%. [22, 25].   
Turkey’s population is about 73 million in 2006. The age composition of Turkey is 
much younger than that of other OECD countries. In Turkey, children 0 to 14 years constitute 
28.1% of the population while individuals aged 65 and above constitute only 6%. In other 
OECD countries, children 0 to 14 years constitute on average 17.6% of the population, while 
individuals aged 65 and above constitute on average 14.9% of the population [25].  
The latest estimates show that life expectancy at birth in Turkey was 72 in 2007 [34]. 
Moreover, Turkey’s infant mortality rate has decreased steadily (from 55.4 per 1000 live 
births in 1990 to 17.6 per 1,000 live births in 2008), but it is still higher than other OECD 
countries’ average (4.6 per 1000 live births in 20063) [24, 25].   
 
Before the HTP reforms, there were three different social security schemes: the Social 
Insurance Organization (SSK), Government Employees Retirement Fund (GERF), and the 
Social Insurance Agency of Merchants, Artisans and the Self-employed (Bag-Kur).  These 
security funds provided both pension and health insurance. SSK covered private sector 
employees and blue-collar public sector employees, Bag-Kur covered self-employed people 
and GERF covered retired civil servants. In addition, health spending of active civil servants 
is financed from the general government budget through the budget of public institution they 
work for. Moreover, the Green Card scheme, which provided free health services for the poor 
is directly funded by the government budget through the MoH budget transfer item. Each of 
these five separate schemes had varying benefit packages and regulations; GERF had the most 
generous benefits package. Prior to the HTP reforms Green Card scheme did not cover 
outpatient care. SSK insurers were restricted to only access to SSK hospitals (they had limited 
access to other type of hospitals only if there were referred). The HTP reforms aimed to 
eliminate the differences in the benefit packages of public health insurance schemes and 
provide equal access to health services for all insured people. Green Card scheme started to 
cover outpatient health expenses in 2004. In order to harmonize the system and control it from 
under one management SSI was established in 2006; SSK, Bag-Kur and GERF have been 
integrated into one institution. Most significantly, in 2008 Universal Health Insurance (UHI) 
was initiated. UHI aims to extend GERF benefits to all insured people. Thus, the benefit 
                                                 
3 For Belgium, Canada and USA we used 2005 data. 
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generosity across the various health insurance schemes is unified under UHI. Ultimately, UHI 
will cover the whole population. However, the reform will take some time; green card holders 
have been planned to be covered by UHI in three years. Active civil servants joined the UHI 
recently (in January/2010). [26, 33 and our own search] 
 
When the HTP was initiated, the number of physicians per 100 thousand people in 
Turkey (123.6) was 47% lower than the average ratio of OECD (181.7 excluding Turkey) in 
1999 [25, 34]. Furthermore, because of low salaries in the public sector, doctors usually 
preferred dual practice. By the end of 2002, the share of full-time physicians was 11 % 
compared to 89% working part-time [1]. Indeed, according to a study in 2001, public sector 
physicians who work part-time in private health care facilities earned 5 times more with 
respect to those working full-time in public sector [35]. Consequently, there was a scarcity in 
the number of doctors at the MoH hospitals. The conditions of the MoH facilities 
(overcrowding, long waiting times, poor quality, poor responsiveness, and lack of adequate 
operational resources) were satisfactory neither for the patients nor for the health personnel. 
Furthermore, the HTP reforms improved access to health care services and caused an increase 
in demand for health care services. The increased demand has been aimed to be 
counterbalanced by increased productivity of health staff in the MoH facilities. Thus, the 
supplementary payment system has been initiated in 2004. The P4P system links the 
individual bonus payments of the staff members to their performance and encourages them to 
provide productive and qualified health care services. Besides the improvement of health 
personnel performance, the P4P system has fostered full-time work in the public sector by 
adding a positive multiplier in the formulation of the bonus payments. Also, an aggregate 
amount of bonus payments is adjusted by the institutional performance multiplier. In this 
approach, the institutional performance of the hospital affects the supplementary payment of 
health staff, thus inducing group incentives to achieve overall institutional performance 
criteria.  
  
Furthermore, prior to the HTP reforms, there was an inequality in the distribution of 
health workers. Socio-economically less-developed eastern and southeastern areas had the 
lowest ratio of health personnel to population. This region of Turkey had the lowest number 
of outpatient visits, because of both the inefficiency in the supply of the health services and 
the poorness of the population. [22-24, 26] However with the HTP reforms on the planning of 
health staff, newly graduated doctors are encouraged to serve in disadvantaged areas with a 
combine of regulatory and financial incentives. [10, 35]. 
 
The MoH Hospitals’ Finance 
 
The MoH Hospitals are operated as extra-budgetary revolving funds (RFs). RFs 
revenues are financing more than 80% of the total hospital budget. The greatest financer of 
the MoH hospitals’ RFs is the SSI, whose reimbursements constitute 70% of the MoH 
hospitals’ total RFs revenues in 2007.4 Although RFs provide flexibility over hospital budget 
management, this was in fact not the case before the HTP reforms. With the HTP, the MoH 
has focused on its stewardship role and provided more independence and flexibility to the 
management of the MoH hospitals. Essentially, the P4P provides freedom over the 
management of the RFs. According to the P4P, up to 40% of the RF revenues can be 
distributed as supplementary payments to the hospital staff.  
                                                 
4 The MoH Strategy Development Headship Data, 2009. 
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When the HTP launched, payment by health insurance schemes operated on a 
retrospective basis (fee-for-service). The payment system was showing differences across the 
five separate public health insurance schemes. Indeed, charge of the health services was 
changing depending on the type of hospital. In order to coordinate health payments, SSI has 
developed a bundled price for inpatient and outpatient health services under the 2007 health 
budget law. Bundled prices of health services were set upon procedural and ICD 10 coding 
systems. Thus, identical prices across all health insurance schemes and public and private 
health facilities have been introduced.5 In this sense, the health payment system has started to 
approach a prospective payment scheme.  
Although the health expenditures were sustainable during the period of reforms, its 
burden was ever-increasing for the SSI. In response to rapidly growing MoH expenditures, the 
SSI agreed with the MOH on a capped annual budget (global budget) for all MoH hospitals in 
2006. This global budget was decided depending on the past realizations of the MoH hospitals 
revolving funds expenditures and the medium-term budget forecasts. The MoH hospitals were 
paid on a monthly basis. These payments were regulated by the MoH to meet the capped 
annual budget. In practice since 2006, a global budget has been applied in the MoH hospitals 
but its law was officially inured in January 2009. [1, 24, 26] 
 
 
Background on Efficiency and Its Measurement 
 
 According to Farell [14], if a firm is producing maximal output given its available 
inputs, or equivalently utilizing the minimum level of inputs given the amount of outputs, it is 
said to be technically efficient. Furthermore, scale efficiency refers the losses due to non-
optimal production size. The productivity on the other hand is an absolute concept. It is 
defined as the ratio of an index of the outputs to an index of the inputs utilized to produce 
them. Total factor productivity (TFP) growth evaluates how much productivity changes over 
time. When there are more outputs relative to the quantity of given inputs, then TFP increases. 
TFP change can be decomposed into technical efficiency change (EFFCH) and technological 
change (TECHCH) [12]. TFP rises if the firm uses its existing inputs more efficiently, so the 
firm can produce more while consuming the same levels of inputs. In other words, TPF grows 
as technical efficiency grows. Also, TFP can increase because of technological change such as 
adopting innovations like advanced IT technologies, improved designs and products. 
 In this paper we focus on technical and scale efficiencies. Furthermore, we analyze the 
TFP changes and their causes for the public hospitals which are compared in terms of 
provinces. In order to compute these analyses, we employ the data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) method. The DEA is a nonparametric technique which estimates the production 
functions and has been extensively used to evaluate technical efficiency (TE) in a range of 
industries when a set of reasonably homogeneous decision-making units (DMUs) have 
multiple inputs and outputs. DEA constructs a non-parametric envelopment frontier 
(envelopment surface) over the data points so as all observed combinations of inputs and 
outputs lie on or below the production possibilities frontier. DMUs that define (lie on) the 
frontier are deemed technically efficient and are assigned an efficiency score of one. Units 
that lie below the efficiency frontier are termed inefficient compared to their peers. The 
inefficient DMUs are assigned a score between one and zero. A larger score denotes a more 
efficient a DMU. [5, 7, 8]. 
                                                 
5 At the beginning, private health providers were allowed to charge 100% above the prices paid by SSI. 
However, in July 2008, private facilities are restricted to bill at most 30% above the price paid by SSI.  
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 DEA offers various models according to scale. There are two scale assumptions 
usually employed: constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS). The 
CRS assumption is suitable if all DMU’s are working at an optimal scale. The technical 
efficieny score of a DMU under CRS is termed total technical efficiency (TECRS). Total 
technical efficiency can be decomposed into pure technical efficiency (that is, technical 
efficiency score under VRS, TEVRS) and scale efficiency. Under imperfect competition and 
constraints on finance, DMUs can not  operate at optimal scale. The VRS model handles such 
situations. VRS states the fact that production technology may display increasing, constant, or 
decreasing returns to scale. The difference between total and pure technical efficiency scores 
implies the scale inefficiency of that DMU. Scale efficiency (SE) can be stated: SE = TECRS/ 
TEVRS. If a DMU performs under increasing returns to scale, that firm is scale inefficient since 
it has potential to produce a larger number of outputs. If a DMU operates under decreasing 
returns to scale, it is inefficient because of achieving outputs that are too large. Furthermore, 
the orientaion of the DEA model should be chosen depending on which quantities (inputs or 
outputs) the managers have the most control over.  
In this study, we employ the output-oriented VRS DEA model to achieve the pure 
technical and scale efficiencies of public hospitals before and after the reform and then 
compare the mean of the efficiency scores. The VRS is chosen since, in the Turkish hospital 
market, there are imperfect competition and financial constraints. The output orientation is 
preferred, since the P4P system encourages the MoH hospitals to increase the number of 
health care services provided (i.e. the outputs) given available inputs. Indeed, the MoH 
managers have limited autonomy to hire or fire staff and all staffing decisions were made by 
the MoH.[26].   
 
The output-oriented VRS DEA model is a very well-known technique. It can be seen 
in detail from Färe, Grosskopf and Lowell [13] and Seiford and Thrall [30].  
 
 Furthermore, in our analysis the output-oriented model of DEA-Malmquist is 
employed in order to assess TFP change, EFFCH, and TECHCH between the years 2001 and 
2006, the years before and after reform. The output based Malmquist productivity change 
index is defined as follows [12, 13]:  
   m0(yt+1, xt+1, yt, xt) = { [d0t(xt+1, yt+1)/ d0t(xt, yt)] * [d0t+1(xt+1, yt+1)/ d0t+1(xt, yt)] }1/2       (1) 
 
This equation states the productivity of the production point (xt+1, yt+1) with respect to the 
production point (xt, yt). This index is the geometric mean of two output based Malmquist 
TFP indices, such that one index applies period t technology and the other period t+1 
technology. If the Malmquist productivity change index is greater than one, the improvement 
in productivity is gained relative to the previous year. However, if the index is less than one 
the productivity deteriorates, and if the index is equal to one then no productivity change 
occurred. 
 The Malmquist index of total factor productivity change (TFPCH) can be decomposed 
into technical efficiency change and technological change, as follows: 
TFPCH = EFFCH x TECHCH.                                                 (2) 
Technical efficiency change evaluates the change in efficiency between period t and t+1, as 
the technological change (progress) captures the shift of the production frontier.  
 
Literature Survey 
 
Since hospitals employ multiple inputs to produce multiple outputs, the use of DEA in 
the study of hospital efficiency is very common [16]. Indeed, there are a number of studies 
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that employ the DEA based Malmquist productivity index analysis to evaluate the impact of 
financial reforms in the health sector on the efficiency of the hospitals, such as: Linna [19], 
Sommersguter-Reichmann [31] and Chen [6]. Linna [19] found significant improvement in 
productivity and efficiency in Finnish hospitals after the 1993 health care financing reform. 
Sommersguter-Reichmann [31] considered the 1997 hospital financing reform in Austria and 
observed a noticeably positive shift in technology, whereas no technical efficiency 
improvement occurred after the reform. Chen [6] assessed the 1995 Taiwan hospital financing 
reform. His study indicates significant technical efficiency gains, but technological progress 
does not take place. Furthermore, Aletras et al. [2] evaluated the efficiency impact of the 2001 
Greek National Health System reform. They employed DEA methodology to achieve the 
technical and scale efficiencies of public hospitals for the pre and post reform years and then 
compared the mean of these efficiency scores. Their analyses point out that technical and 
scale efficiency has been reduced following the reform. 
 There are three major studies considering the hospital sector efficiency in Turkey 
employing the DEA: Ersoy et al. [9], Sahin and Ozcan [28], and Sahin et al. [29]. Ersoy et al. 
[9] computed the technical efficiencies of 573 Turkish acute general hospitals in 1994. Their 
results illustrate that more than ninety percent of hospitals operated inefficiently compared to 
their counterparts. They found that inefficient hospitals, relative to efficient ones, use 32% 
more specialists, 47% more primary care physicians, and 119% more staffed bed capacity 
while producing 13% less outpatient visits, 16% inpatient hospitalization, and 57% less 
surgical procedures on average. Sahin and Ozcan [28] have examined the public sector 
hospital efficiency in 80 provincial markets in Turkey in 1996. They found that there were 
inefficient structures in 44 provinces, which means that 55% of the public hospitals in served 
markets were operated inefficiently. They point out that compared to efficient provinces, 
inefficient provinces are collectively over-bedded, use an excessive number of health laborers 
including the specialists, and spend almost $70,000,000 in excess from their revolving funds. 
Sahin et al. [29] examines the operational performance of the 352 MoH general public 
hospitals after the HTP took place during 2005–2008. They found that the operational 
performance of these hospitals progressed during the considered period.  
 In this study we consider the public sector hospital efficiency in all provincial markets 
in Turkey to assess how the HTP reforms have affected public hospitals’ performance 
considering the years of 2001 and 2006 (pre- and post-reform) by employing the DEA 
approach. Similar to Sahin and Ozcan [28], we compare public hospitals in terms of provinces 
serving as the Decision Making Units.  
 
 
 Data 
 
Data and Data Sources 
  
In 2001, there were 751 hospitals operated by the MoH, 118 SSK hospitals and 43 
university hospitals. Although, SSK’s total number of hospitals was relatively small, it was 
the second biggest producer of the health sector services. In 2001, 35% of total outpatient 
visits and 27% of total inpatient cases have been produced by the SSK hospitals. Indeed, the 
SSK hospitals constituted 16% of the hospital sector bed capacity and the total number of 
specialists that worked in SSK was 15% of the all the specialists who were employed in the 
health care sector. In 2004, the MoH and SSK signed protocol for common use of their health 
facilities, and in 2005, all SSK hospitals had been transferred to the MoH. Indeed, during 
2005 and 2006 most of these transferred hospitals were merged with the MoH hospitals. 
Therefore, the increase in the MoH hospitals’ healthcare services after the reform (in 2006) 
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could be attributed to these transfers and mergers. This situation would obviously cause a bias 
in our efficiency analysis. As we could not eliminate the SSK hospitals from 2006 data since 
they were already transferred to the MoH management, for 2001 we have also included the 
SSK hospitals’ input and output data into our analysis.  
 
 The university hospitals are operated according to totally different operational systems 
and regulations. Consequently, the university hospitals are not included in our analysis. 
Hence, main public health care providers, except university hospitals, in 81 provinces in 
Turkey that responded to the annually published MoH Statistical Year Book of Inpatient 
Health Care Organizations of Turkey, 2001 and 2006, were included in this analysis [20, 21]. 
The input and output variables used in this analysis are obtained from these statistical year 
books.  
 
Measures 
 
 In this study, the output and input variables have been chosen according to the 
literature and availability of the data. The descriptions of input and output variables are 
presented in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1. Description of the Variables of Interest  
Variables Description 
Output variables  
 Outpatient visits The number of outpatient visits within a year. 
 Inpatient cases case-mix adjusted The annual number of hospitalized cases (including 
both discharges and deaths) adjusted for case-mix by 
Roemer index. 
 Total number of surgery The total number of surgeries within a year. 
Input variables  
 Beds The number of existing patient beds within the 
hospital ready for use. 
 Specialists The total number of specialist medical doctors 
employed in the public hospitals in the province. 
 General practitioners The total number of general practitioners employed in 
the public hospitals in the province. 
Hospital quality indicators  
 Hospital mortality rate Hospital mortality rate is the ratio of the number of 
inpatients die during hospitalization to the number of 
inpatients.  
 Bed occupation rate It refers to the percentage of beds that are occupied by 
inpatients at any given time (= total patient 
days*100/existing patient beds*duration) duration is 
taken as 365.* 
 Average length of stay  It is the average amount of time spent in hospital 
which is defined as the mean number of days that an 
inpatient stays in hospital from the time of admission 
to discharge (= Total patient days/(total number of 
patients discharged or death)). *  
Notes: *: Definitions are taken from the MoH Statistical Year Book of Inpatient Health Care Organizations, 
2006.  
 
 The outputs of visits to hospital emergency and outpatient facilities, the number of 
hospitalized cases (discharges and deaths), and the number of surgical operations performed, 
capture the major outputs of the hospitals. However, hospitals do not serve the patients that 
are in identical conditions; there are always differences in terms of patient’s characteristics, 
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complications, and severity of illness. In order to manage this situation, previous studies have 
introduced case mix indices or such a correction is neglected at all [2, 11, 27]. In Turkey, with 
the 2007 health budget law, all public and private hospitals under agreement with SSI are 
obligated to report claims including a patient’s information (such as a patient’s age, sex, and 
diagnosis) through the MEDULA, which is an integrated claims and utilization management 
system. However, access to this data is not yet accessible to researchers. Because of lack of 
data, we used a quite basic case-mix index proposed by Roemer et al. [27] to adjust hospital 
inpatient cases. Roemer case-mix index multiplies average length of stay (ALS) of a DMU by 
its occupancy rate and divides this by the average occupancy of all the samples. Here, ALS 
depends on case-mix complexity as well as other factors such as bed availability and age. 
According to the Roemer formula, ALS will be adjusted upwards if the DMU’s occupancy 
rate is above the average level, because that DMU is inclined to hospitalize its patients longer 
if they do not have a space availability problem. Finally, to compute case-mix adjusted 
inpatient cases, the annual number of hospitalized cases in each DMU has been multiplied by 
the Roemer case-mix index and divided by the respective mean in the sample [15, 17]. 
 Besides the individual performance, the P4P system also encourages the hospital to 
fulfill overall institutional quality. The occupation rate and average length of stay are among 
the crucial institutional productivity indicators that the MoH considers during audits of 
institutional performance [24]. Thus, in this study we consider the hospital mortality rate, the 
occupation rate, and average stay length as quality indicators of the inpatient health care 
services supplied by the hospital. We compare and statistically analyze their pre and post 
reform realizations by employing t-tests. However, in the efficiency analysis, dealing with the 
quality has been quite the exception [2, 4]. Indeed, although DEA is a powerful optimization 
technique, the discriminatory power of the DEA will be limited if one has to manage with a 
large numbers of factors (inputs and outputs) when a small number of DMUs are under 
assessment. This limitation is defeated by eliminating the factors which are strongly positively 
correlated with each other. We have implicitly included the mortality rate, ALS, and the 
occupation rate in our data by considering case-mix adjusted inpatient cases. Therefore, to 
prevent correlation among factors, we did not use these quality indicators in our DEA 
analysis.  
 The input variables employed in this study can be classified as labor and capital. The 
annual numbers of the specialists and the general practitioners are used as labor inputs. The 
annual number of hospital beds is used as capital proxy. The MoH Statistical Year Book of 
Inpatient Health Care Organizations (2001, 2006) does not include the number of nurses and 
other allied professionals at the hospital nor provincial level. Therefore, these variables are 
not included.  
 The pre-reform study of Sahin and Ozcan [28] employs the revolving funds 
expenditures to reflect other operational costs. In this study, the RF expenditure data is not 
available for the MoH hospitals for 2006. Indeed, we do not have the data of operational costs 
for the SSK hospitals. As a result, the RF expenditures were not included in our efficiency 
analysis. In this study Data Envelopment Analysis (Computer) Program (DEAP) version 2.1 
is used to conduct the data envelopment analysis [7].  
 
Empirical Results 
 
Descriptive statistics for the public hospitals in terms of provinces serving as DMUs in 
this study are presented in Table 2 relative to the years 2001 and 2006. First, it is seen that all 
output and input variables have increased between 2001 and 2006. The mean of the outpatient 
visits has increased 78%, from 1,317 thousands to 2,339 thousands, and this difference is 
statistically significant (t= 2.58, p<0.01). The mean of inpatient cases rose 30.3%, from 
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50,000 to 65,000, but this increase is not statistically significant (t=1.32, p>0.05). Similarly, 
the mean of case-mix adjusted inpatient cases rose approximately 20%, from 50,000 to 65,000 
(t=0.62, p>0.05). Following the reforms, the mean of total number of surgeries greatly 
increased 122%, from 16,000 to 36,000 (t= 2.39, p<0.05). Even though the mean number of 
inpatient cases and surgeries dramatically increased, the bed occupation rate almost stayed 
same (slightly increased from 55.2% to 55.9% between the years of 2001 and 2006). Indeed, 
the ALS decreased slightly from 4.80 days to 4.75 days between pre and post reform years. 
Furthermore, the mean hospital mortality rate slightly yet insignificantly increased (from 
0,010 to 0,012) (t=0.68, p>0.05). Lastly, all of the input variables rose between 2001 and 
2006. During this period, the total number of beds, specialists, and general practitioners rose 
around 18%, 26% and 27.7%, respectively.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of output and input variables in 2001 and 2006 (N=81) 
 
 
Source: Our own findings using the data obtained from the Statistical Year Book of Inpatient Health Care 
Organizations of Turkey, 2001 and 2006. Notes: The statistical tests are computed against the reference group 
which is taken as the 2006 variables. (a) and (b) denote the statistical difference respectively at 1% and 5% 
significance levels. 
  
 
The mean Malmquist productivity index changes between 2001 and 2006 for DMUs that are 
obtained from the output oriented Malmquist DEA model (Table 3). The results show that, on 
average, the MoH hospitals in terms of provinces experienced total factor productivity growth 
during the period analyzed since TFPCH=1.32>1. The TFP has improved in 74 provincial 
markets and decreased only in 7 provincial markets (Ardahan, Elazığ, Kars, Kırıkkale, Muş, 
Siirt, Şırnak) that are all among the socio-economically least developed provinces, except 
Elazığ and Kırıkkale, according to the State Planning Organization categorization. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that the average changes are positive in both technological 
progress and technical efficiency, with growth indices of 1.21>1 and 1.09>1, respectively. 
Thus, in our case, the overall TFP growth has occurred because of both the technology 
progress (frontier shift) and the technical efficiency growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Malmquist Productivity Change Index Summary for provincial markets 
  
  Overall mean for all (N=81) 
provincial markets  Min.  Max. 
TFPCH 1.32 0.37 2.50 
TECHCH 1.21 0.53 1.77 
EFFCH 1.09 0.29 1.87 
 Number of provincial markets that Malquimst indexes are: 
 >1 (improvement) =1 (no change) <1 (decrease) 
TFPCH 74 0 7 
TECHCH 76 0 5 
EFFCH 50 6 25 
Source: Our own findings. Note: All Malmquist index averages are geometric means.  
 
 We then focused on the technical efficiency gain in detail by decomposing it into pure 
technical and scale efficiency components. The technical and scale efficiency statistics and 
the ranking of the provincial markets have been given in Table 4.  We used the Wilcoxon test 
to compare the performance of the public hospitals in served markets in the two study years. 
The analysis indicated that between years 2001 and 2006, the mean technical efficiency of all 
provincial markets significantly increased from 77% to 83.5% when we assume constant 
returns to scale in the production (z= -3.3, p=0.001). This information implies that before the 
reform (in 2001) the output could have been increased on average 23% with the same input 
levels. The respective feasible increase after the reform (in 2006) was found to be 
considerably lower, 16.5%. Under CRS technology, 50 provincial markets have increased 
their technical efficiency, 25 have reduced it, and 6 were efficient in both periods. When we 
consider the mean pure technical efficiency (under variable returns to scale in the production), 
a statistically insignificant increase from 87% to 88% is observed (z=-0.58, p=0.562) between 
2001 and 2006. This information implies that in 2001 the output could have been increased on 
average 13% with the same input levels. The respective feasible increase after the reform was 
seen to be almost same 12%. Under VRS technology, 32 provincial markets have increased 
their pure technical efficiency, 30 have reduced it, and 19 were efficient in both periods.     
[see Table 4] 
 
 The mean scale efficiency has risen significantly from 88.4% to 94.8%, (z=-4.24, 
p<0.0001). According to our analysis, 53 provincial markets have increased their scale 
efficiency, 22 have reduced it, and 6 were efficient in both periods. The average scale 
efficiency improvement after the reform could have been attributed to a considerable increase 
in the mean bed size. Moreover, it is interesting to report that before the reform only 7 DMUs 
were operating under increasing returns to scale (IRS) and 56 DMUs were employing 
decreasing returns to scale (DRS). But after the reform 28 DMUs became operating under IRS 
and 37 DMUs under DRS (Table 4). IRS implies that a DMU should produce a bigger number 
of outputs whereas DRS implies that DMU should scale down its production in order to 
improve efficiency.  
Our analysis shows that the overall mean technical efficiency gains have been reached 
because of significantly improved scale efficiency; as the average pure technical has only 
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slightly and insignificantly improved. Furthermore, the lower mean pure technical efficiency, 
in comparison to the mean scale efficiency, suggests that inefficiencies are mostly due to 
inefficient management practices. Since 2003, the HTP has initiated important institutional, 
administrative, and operational changes. Our analysis suggests the lack of adaptation of the 
public hospitals’ management to the renewed health system in the short-run.  
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The HTP aimed to reduce the regional disparities in utilization of health services and 
improve access to health services in disadvantaged areas by providing equality in the 
distribution of health workers as well as improving the health insurance coverage for the poor 
[10, 35]. However, our DEA Malquimst index results find that 5 provinces out of 7 provinces, 
whose TFP have been deteriorated, were belonging to the socio-economically least developed 
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area. Therefore, we further investigated the efficiency and productivity of the hospitals served 
in socio-economically least developed provinces. According to the State Planning 
Organization categorization, there are 17 provinces that constitute the socio-economically 
least developed group [32]. Thus, we separately consider these provinces in Table 5. The 
findings of the DEA Malmquist index indicate that no change occurred after the reforms in 
the productivity of the public hospitals that served in the least developed provinces (average 
TFP change index was equal to 1). Also, it is found that the average technical efficiency 
deteriorated as the average of indices was 0.94. However, the technological progress has 
upgraded, as the average index growth was 1.06. Hence, in the public hospitals that served in 
the socio-economically least developed provinces, the TFP has not been upgraded mainly due 
to the deterioration in the technical efficiency, even though improvement was achieved in the 
technological progress. 
 
Table 5. Socio-economically disadvantaged provinces: Malmquist index efficiency change 
summary, between 2001 & 2006  
Provinces EFFCH TECHCH TFPCH 
Adıyaman 0.97 1.13 1.09 
Ağrı  1.22 1.07 1.30 
Bingöl 1.00 1.04 1.04 
Bitlis 1.48 0.88 1.30 
Gümüşhane 1.33 0.94 1.24 
Hakkari 1.42 1.27 1.79 
Kars 0.79 1.15 0.91 
Mardin 1.20 1.10 1.32 
Muş 0.70 1.25 0.88 
Siirt 0.29 1.27 0.37 
Tunceli 1.23 0.89 1.09 
Van 1.07 1.32 1.41 
Bayburt 1.00 1.17 1.17 
Batman 1.00 1.22 1.22 
Şırnak 0.72 0.53 0.38 
Ardahan 0.72 0.86 0.62 
Iğdır 0.81 1.31 1.06 
Overall Average 0.94 1.06 1.00 
    Note: All Malmquist index averages are geometric means. 
 
Lastly, we analyzed the efficiencies of the MoH hospitals in all provincial markets 
without employing the case-mixed adjustments (that is with out the Roemer index 
adjustments). The results are given in Table 6. First of all, it is seen that between 2001 and 
2006 the mean technical efficiency increased from 78.7 to 86.5 (p<0.01). Second, the mean 
pure technical efficiency has slightly decreased from 95.9% to 93.7% (p<0.05). Finally, the 
mean scale efficiency was 81.9% in 2001 and increased to 92.4% in 2006 (p<0.01). Hence, 
these results are parallel to our previous findings that the overall technical efficiency gains 
have been reached because of improved scale efficiency. 
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Discussion  
 
 Our analysis finds out that there is a rapid raise from a stagnant and inefficient system 
into an active system in the short-run. Therefore, we will discuss the main possible effects of 
this situation on the other dimensions of hospital performance.  
 One of the weaknesses of the P4P system applied in the MoH hospitals in Turkey is 
that the bonus payments are done mainly depending on the output but not the outcome. 
Between the years of 2001 and 2006, the mean outpatient visits, inpatient cases, and total 
number of surgeries rose 78%, 30% and 122%, respectively. Since our analysis found very 
large increases in the number of the outputs in only five years, it raises the question of 
whether the unnecessary demand has been induced because of an asymmetry of information 
on the actual needs and demands of patients. However, further studies are necessary to query 
this situation.  
 Second of all, the enormous increase in the quantity of the delivered activities brings 
to question the quality of care. As mentioned, the P4P system links the individual bonus 
payments of the health staff to the institutional performance criteria, including institutional 
productivity such as bed occupation rate, ALS, and inpatient rate in order to persuade 
qualified health care services. However, our results indicate that the quality indicators have 
not improved in the short-run between 2001 and 2006. The bed occupation rate almost stayed 
the same (about 55%). In addition, the mean hospital mortality rate slightly (but 
insignificantly) increased. According to Barnum and Kutzin [3], hospitals in developing 
countries operate most efficiently at 85-90% occupation rate. However, they point out that it 
is not unusual to find hospitals operating at less than half that level, either because of very low 
perceived quality of care or the nonexistence of enough people for the size of hospital in the 
area that hospital is settled (such misallocation of resources is likely to be politically driven). 
Even though, in our study, the mean number of inpatient care services and surgeries increased 
enormously, the same low occupancy rate is a possible signal of low quality in health care. 
Planning the location of the health care facilities according to the needs of the population has 
been started in Turkey with a noticed published on February 15, 2008 to prevent the 
uncontrollable and fast increase in the number of private health care facilities.  
 In our study, ALS is also considered as a quality indicator. We have found that the 
ALS decreased very slightly and insignificantly from 4.80 to 4.75 between the years of 2001 
and 2006. Even though the decrease in ALS is insignificant due to the great increase in the 
number of inpatient care services, it can be an early signal that patients are not hospitalized 
for the medically required amount of time.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It appears that the expected benefits from the HTP reforms have been partially 
achieved in the short-run. First of all, this study concludes that the performance based 
supplementary payment system was successful in boosting the health staff productivity, 
providing widespread use of the latest technologies and providing an increased volume of 
health care services which were previously under-met. Furthermore, our analyses found that 
in the MoH hospitals that served in provincial markets, the average technical efficiency gains 
took place because of the improved scale efficiencies, but that the average pure technical 
efficiency was not improved. The lower pure technical efficiencies compared to scale 
efficiencies affirms the lack of adaptation of the hospital management to the renewed system 
in the short-run. Additionally, our analyses indicate that in the socio-economically most 
disadvantaged provinces (17 out of 81 provinces), productivity gains have not been achieved 
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because of the deterioration in the technical efficiency, even though there was an 
improvement in the technological progress. 
 Although the productivity of the doctors has been provided in general, how confident 
can one be that measured improvements in output are resulting in a genuine health gain? 
Unfortunately, the present study found that the quality indicators considered (the bed 
occupation rate, the hospital mortality rate, and ALS) have not improved in the short-run 
between the 2001 and 2006. Furthermore, since the P4P system applied in the MoH hospitals 
in Turkey is rewarding the production of previously under-provided health services, a quick 
progress from a static and inefficient system to an active system is observed in the short-run. 
The increase in the volume of the output was expected, but our analysis of productivity 
indicates that the health staff has much more control over the quantitative production of the 
hospitals than previously thought. 
 In the literature performance based supplementary payment systems and the health 
system reforms have been studied extensively for the developed countries. However, there are 
a few studies on developing countries. As it has been noted in the OECD health system 
review of Turkey [26]: “Turkey is closing the performance gap with other OECD countries 
and, on a number of measures including overall costs, performs well relative to other 
comparable upper middle-income countries. Indeed, there may be much that other countries 
can learn from the recent health reforms in Turkey, especially in the use of performance-
related pay to raise staff productivity”. Thus, this study contributes to the existing literature 
with a widespread analysis of the health system performance in Turkey.  
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